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Abstract 
In response to the challenge of sustaining the health gains achieved in the better-performing states 
and ensuring that the lagging states catch up with the rest of the country, the Indian government has 
launched the National Rural Health Mission. A central goal of the effort is to increase public spending on 
health from the current 1.1 percent of GDP to roughly 2–3 percent of GDP within the next five years. In 
this paper, we examine the current status of health financing in India, as well as alternatives for realizing 
maximal health gains for the incremental expenditures.  
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In response to the challenge of sustaining the health gains in the better-performing states and ensuring 
that lagging states catch up with the rest of the country, the Indian government has launched the 
National Rural Health Mission (NRHM). A central goal of the mission is to increase public 
expenditure on health from the current 1.1 percent of GDP to roughly 2-3 percent of GDP within the 
next five years. The NRHM has a clear geographical focus on rural areas, especially in the 18 states 
that have weak health outcomes and infrastructure, including nine particularly disadvantaged states, 
which are henceforth referred to (using a modification of Government of India terminology) as the 
Empowered Action Group plus Assam or EAGA states (see Text Box 1).
3 
In this paper, we examine the current status and future prospects of health financing in India in 
light of the NRHM. Much has been written on this issue and our contribution is to synthesize what is 
known in the context of the NRHM. Our objective is to draw attention to the benefits of public health 
spending, explore reasons why public spending has been much more effective at improving health 
outcomes in some regions but not in others, and to apply lessons learnt from the Disease Control 
Priorities Project-India or DCPP-India to the question of how best to deploy the new financial 
resources made available by the NRHM.
4 
Given the large health and institutional disparities between EAG and non-EAG states, the 
financing challenges are quite different in the two groups. In EAG states such as Bihar, Madhya 
                                                 
1 The authors are, respectively, Professor of Economics, University of California, Riverside; T & G Angelopoulos Visiting 
Professor of Public Health and International Development, Kennedy School of Government and School of Public Health, 
Harvard University; and Senior Fellow, Resources for the Future. 
2 In revising this paper, the authors benefited considerably from comments by participants at a workshop in New Delhi on 
January 8, 2007 (chaired by Mr. Rajiv Misra) and from comments by Anna Abreu, Peter Berman, David de Ferranti, 
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Uttar Pradesh. Empowered Action Group states designated by the Government of India are Bihar, Chattisgarh, Jharkhand, 
Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh and Uttaranchal. These plus Assam make up the EAGA states 




Pradesh, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, and Orissa, which together account for 45 percent of India’s 
population, the health challenge is primarily high levels of infant and child mortality and child 
malnutrition. In contrast, in non-EAG states such as Kerala, Tamil Nadu and Gujarat, non-
communicable diseases are fast replacing infectious diseases and malnutrition as the leading causes of 
morbidity and mortality. Our paper primarily focuses on the EAG states. It does so, however, from the 
perspective of long-term implications for India of the financial architecture established for the NRHM. 
Figure 1 illustrates the approach we take in this paper. One can consider health systems to have 
two broad objectives – to improve the level (and distribution) of health outcomes and to provide 
financial protection to the population, both from unanticipated large health expenditures and from 
income loss. Similarly, as a first approximation, one can consider health systems to have two types of 
resources at their disposal – financial and system capacity. DCPP-India and related efforts provide a 
good deal of quantitative information on the control of the shaded box – the financial costs of 
achieving health gains in different ways. 
It is also important to bear in mind the other dimensions of the box. All too often, provision of 
financial protection is discussed without a sense of either budget constraints or the cost-effectiveness 
of alternative instruments for acquiring it. And, often, non-financial implementation constraints are 
ignored.
5 In this paper, we attempt to address both of these shortcomings. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 1 provides a brief account of India’s progress in 
health and the problems that remain. In section 2, we summarize the current status of state and central 
government spending on health, and the implications of the NRHM in terms of its ability to displace 
private expenditure of the poor and to offer financial protection to both the poor and the non-poor. We 
evaluate the potential benefits of the proposed increased health spending on improving health 
outcomes and providing financial risk protection against adverse health events. Section 2 also explores 
the extent to which the failure of EAG states in India to perform at the level of non-EAG states is a 
matter of insufficient resources as opposed to limited institutional and implementation capacity. We 
assess the extent to which the additional funding from NRHM will address the financing gap.  
Clearly, additional resources will be effective in achieving desired health and financial 
protection goals only if they are targeted efficiently. In section 3, we discuss criteria for determining an 
                                                 
5 Croghan (2006) reports case studies of rapid health improvements in four countries (including Bangladesh) where 
thoughtful policies were able to achieve success despite weak health systems and broader institutional problems. Two 
common characteristics of these policies were tight focus on key interventions and continued, effective use of technical 




intervention package for NRHM that will achieve these results while being cost-effective and scaleable 
even in settings of low institutional and service delivery capacity. This section draws on the findings of 
the DCPP-India project, especially its identification of key areas of focus for the NRHM with 
potentially large gains in health. The main objective and contribution of this paper is to place the 
recommendations of the DCPP-India in the context of a sustainable financial framework.  
In section 4, we raise issues of service delivery in low-capacity settings. Issues of improving 
public-sector performance and leveraging the enormous capacity of the private health sector to 
successfully deliver health care are central to any health system, but we have devoted relatively less 
attention to these questions given our focus on health financing. In Section 5, we discuss the mechanics 
of financing these health interventions and the implications for center-state financial responsibilities. 
Section 6 explores whether there are useful lessons from the financing of universal elementary 
education in India and from health financing initiatives in other countries. In section 7, we describe the 
main messages and conclusions of the paper. 
A. Progress and Problems in Health 
To most observers of India, the 1990s stood out for economic reforms, unprecedented GDP growth, 
and significant improvement in living standards for many Indians. However, the gains in health and 
longevity which were similarly remarkable and economically important are much less appreciated. 
Over the course of the decade, under-five mortality dropped at an annual rate of 2.2 percent and life 
expectancy at birth increased from 59 to 64 years. Some have argued that when these improvements in 
health are taken into consideration, the sharp differences between India and China in economic 
performance during the 1990s are much less striking (Bloom, Canning et al. 2006). 
However, as with all stories, there are two sides to this one. The improvements in child health 
in India, although remarkable, have been modest in comparison to those in some of its neighbors in 
South Asia. For instance, the 2.2 percent annual rate of decline in infant mortality, while roughly 
comparable to the decline in most countries at India’s level of per capita income, was modest 
compared to the 5.7 percent decline experienced by Bangladesh and the 4.2 percent decline 
experienced by Nepal over the same period.6 India’s record at reducing child malnutrition, maternal 
mortality, adult mortality, and prevalence of communicable diseases has similarly fallen short of its 
neighbors. 
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Moreover, improvements in health have not been shared equally among all Indians. Rates of 
decline in infant mortality over the last quarter-century have been uneven across states (Figure 2). 
Infant mortality rates declined by 68 percent (from 37 to 12) in Kerala, but only by (a still respectable) 
52 percent in Uttar Pradesh (150 per 1000 to 72) between 1981 and 2004. Uttar Pradesh alone 
contributes one-quarter of all infant deaths in the country, and, along with Madhya Pradesh, Bihar and 
Rajasthan, accounts for slightly more than one-half of all infant deaths in India (Figure 3). Infant 
deaths are even more concentrated when one considers the lower district level (Figure 4). Only ten 
percent of the 602 districts in India accounted for nearly 30 percent of all infant deaths in the country 
during 1994-99, while approximately one-half of all infant deaths in the country during that period 
occurred in only 23 percent of the districts.7 
In addition to geographical disparities in health outcomes, there are also large health variations 
across social groups. Scheduled tribes and scheduled castes typically suffer from the worst health 
outcomes. For instance, scheduled tribes have an under-five mortality rate of 117 deaths per 1,000 live 
births and scheduled castes have a rate of 108, compared to an all-India rate of 93. 
An important policy question is whether the tremendous growth that the Indian economy has 
been experiencing lately will, in and of itself, improve health outcomes. After all, there is generally a 
strong relationship between health outcomes and living standards. However, the evidence we have 
reviewed in Text Box 2 suggests that the association between health outcomes and per capita GDP, 
which was relatively strong in the 1980s, has become considerably weaker over time. This implies that 
economic growth alone is less likely to bring about large health improvements in the future, which in 
turn points to a continuing – and even greater – need for public action in health. 
 
II. Health Spending in India 
How does health spending in India compare to that in other countries? Figure 5 suggests that, at about 
$20 (in purchasing power parity terms), India’s per capita public spending on health – currently about 
1.1 percent of GDP - is significantly lower than what would be expected for a country at its level of per 
capita GDP. However, total (private and public) health spending in India is not overly low, because 
private health spending compensates for the low level of public spending. Indeed, India’s total health 
spending – relative to its GDP – is higher than that of almost every other country in South Asia with 
                                                 




the exception of Afghanistan (Figure 6) (although this is not true when India is compared to other low-
income countries outside South Asia). 
What the data suggest is the very high share of private (household) spending in total health 
spending in India. Indeed, at about 80 percent, India has one of the highest shares of private spending 
in the entire world. Even though the cross-country association between the public share in health 
spending and per capita GDP is weak (Figure 7), the ‘norm’ for countries at India’s level of per capita 
GDP is a private share of only 50 percent in total health spending (Figure 8). The unusually high level 
of private spending on health in India means that much of the burden of health spending falls on 
households, a quarter or third of whom have incomes below the poverty line. Increasing public 
spending is likely to ‘crowd out’ private spending on health,8 which would bring important benefits to 
the large number of India’s poor. 
Of course, there is no point in increasing public spending on health if it is likely to yield few 
health benefits. However, international comparisons do not suggest that India has an unusually low 
effectiveness of public spending on health. While comparisons of spending effectiveness across 
countries are notoriously difficult and fraught with methodological difficulties, one simplistic way in 
which to compare the effectiveness of public health spending is to examine the level of health 
outcomes that a given amount of government health expenditure is able to ‘purchase’ across countries. 
Figure 9 suggests that infant mortality in India is significantly lower (by about 50 percent) than would 
be expected for a country that spends only PPP$20 per capita in public spending on health, indicating 
perhaps that spending effectiveness in India is better than average.9 
The above finding should be tempered by three observations. First, other low-income countries 
(e.g., Bangladesh) are able to obtain even lower infant mortality rates than India with their even lower 
(relative to India) levels of public spending on health (Figure 9). Thus, there is likely substantial room 
for further increasing the effectiveness of government health expenditure in India. 
Second, there is likely to be significant heterogeneity in spending effectiveness within India. At 
first glance, it may appear that the effectiveness of public health spending in the EAG states is likely to 
be low, given their weak administrative capacity, poor governance structures, and service delivery 
                                                 
8 Of course, public spending on health will reduce private spending by the poor only if it actually improves service delivery 
to the poor. Also, it is assumed that public spending is not financed out of taxes which fall disproportionately on the poor. 
9 The results could also reflect that India is better endowed than other low-income countries on mortality-reducing factors 
unrelated to public health spending, such as female education. However, this possibility appears unlikely since levels of 




failures. However, because these states are also the ones with the worst health outcomes, it is possible 
that the marginal effect of an additional Rupee of public spending on health in these states could be 
high – even higher in the non-EAG states that have better governance and administrative capacity. This 
issue is addressed later in this paper (in Section 2C on “Benefits of Increased Availability of Public 
Resources”). 
Third, it goes without saying that what matters ultimately is not how much money the public 
sector spends on health but how it is spent (e.g., on what types of interventions, to whom it is targeted, 
and with what degree of technical efficiency). Thus, it is critically important that as the quantity of 
public resources directed to health is increased, so is the quality of this spending. 
A. Financial Implications of NRHM 
Achieving the financing targets of the NRHM will depend upon significant cooperation from the state 
governments. Since health is a state subject, the central government accounts for only one-quarter of 
public health spending in the country, with state governments responsible for the remaining three-
quarters. Many state governments are in a perilous financial situation, with unsustainably high current 
account deficits and debt ratios. It is not clear how the states will be able to finance large increases in 
public spending on health. While international financing of health expenditure has been increasing, it 
cannot possibly constitute more than a very small portion of total health spending in India, given the 
size of the Indian economy.10  
It is useful to put the discussion of the financial implications of the NRHM in the context of the 
trend in public health spending in India. Before the economic reforms in the mid-1980s, public 
spending on health in India had peaked at about 1.6 percent of GDP and 4 percent of the government 
budget. During the 1990s, government health spending did not keep up with the expanding economy 
and budget, with the result that by 2001 public spending on health constituted only 0.9 percent of GDP 
and 2.7 percent of the government budget. These numbers fell further to 0.8 percent and 2.4 percent, 
respectively, by 2005. 
The 2006-07 budget has reversed this trend, and substantially increased allocations to the social 
sectors (education, health, and women and child development). (Most of the additional allocations in 
the health sector will be channeled through the NRHM.) In the Common Minimum Program (CMP), 
                                                 
10 Note that external assistance does constitute a significant and increasing share of national disease-control programs for 




the present UPA government has committed to spending 3 percent of GDP on the health sector before 
its term ends in 2008-09. Assuming that the Indian economy continues to grow at its current rates, 3 
percent of the projected GDP (of Rs. 52,000 billion in current prices) will constitute Rs. 1,500 billion. 
The budget estimates for 2006-07 call for the central government to spend Rs. 130 billion (including in 
central grants to states) and for the states to spend roughly Rs. 285 billion. In other words, the 
commitment of 3 percent of GDP to health spending would call for a quadrupling or quintupling of 
what the central and state governments currently spend on health. Given that the share of the central 
government in public health spending is only 20-35 percent (depending upon whether central grants to 
states are included or not), even an increase of 30-50 percent per annum in central government health 
expenditure over the next few years will not allow a realization of the CMP goal. However, as is 
discussed subsequently in the paper, there is a recent precedent in India’s education sector of the 
central government assuming a much larger share, relative to the states, of public spending to achieve 
its priorities. 
B.State-Level Variations in Health Spending 
Data from the National Health Accounts 2001-02 show wide variations in health spending per capita 
across states (Figure 10). Kerala has the highest annual per capita spending on health (Rs. 1,858), 
followed by Haryana, Punjab, and Himachal Pradesh. At the other end, Assam, Orissa, and Rajasthan 
have the lowest levels of health expenditure per capita. Figure 10 also shows the share of private 
spending in total health spending across states. With the exception of Sikkim, private spending 
accounts for the major portion of health spending in every state. In some states, such as Bihar and Uttar 
Pradesh, private spending accounts for 90 percent or more of total health spending. Surprisingly, even 
in Kerala, which has excellent health indicators and a wide network of public health facilities, and 
Haryana, which is one of the most affluent states in the country, private spending accounts for 90 
percent of total health spending. 
Figure 11 suggests that there is no systematic pattern in the ratio of public expenditure on 
health to gross state domestic product (GSDP). Public expenditure on health is low in relation to state 
income (about 0.6-0.8 percent of GSDP) in relatively affluent states like Haryana and Gujarat as well 
as in a poor state like Uttar Pradesh. On the other hand, public spending on health accounts for as 
much as 1.6 percent of GSDP in a very poor state like Bihar. 
There is some evidence to suggest that private expenditure on health is greater in states that 
have relatively low public spending on health (Figure 12). While this inverse relationship could be 
taken as evidence of the traditional displacement or ‘crowding-out’ effect of public spending, the 




spending on health is extremely low in India relative to most other countries. Households have no 
option but to bear the major burden of health-care expenditure, since the public sector is unable to 
finance or provide adequate amounts of basic health services and infrastructure. The high out-of-
pocket expenditure on health care is an important cause of household impoverishment (see Text Box 
3). In such a situation, an increase in public spending on health that would directly reduce household 
out-of-pocket payments for health care, especially among the poor, would be welfare-enhancing. In 
addition, we review evidence below suggesting that increased public spending on health is likely to 
result in significantly improved health outcomes. 
C. Benefits of Increased Availability of Public Resources 
There are two ways in which increased government expenditure on health can directly improve health 
outcomes. First, increased public spending provides additional resources to the health sector, thereby 
enabling it to provide more and better health services. Empirical studies on the link between health 
spending and health outcomes are inconclusive. Some studies have observed a strong positive 
association between public spending on health and infant mortality (Anand and Ravallion 1993; Bidani 
and Ravallion 1995; Gupta, Tiongson et al. 1999),11 while others have failed to find an effect (Filmer 
and Pritchett 1999). Furthermore, this issue has not been addressed in the Indian context. The 
Appendix contains a preliminary econometric analysis for India, using cross-state data over 20 years. 
The analysis suggests that, at least in terms of one health indicator (infant mortality), a Rupee of public 
spending on health is likely to have a larger effect in the EAG states than in the non-EAG states. This 
may reflect the fact that the high-mortality EAG states have very low coverage – and hence substantial 
room for expansion – of basic low-cost child survival interventions, such as child immunization and 
oral rehydration therapy. In the low-mortality non-EAG states, these basic interventions are already 
widespread, and infant mortality can only be further reduced through more expensive interventions, 
such as deliveries in medical institutions and post-delivery and emergency hospital-based care. 
Second, public spending on health can be more cost-effective than private spending both 
because it is better directed at interventions that are cost-effective and because of the perverse 
incentive structure in the (largely-unregulated) private sector. In the unregulated private sector, 
especially in the rural areas of EAG states, health workers have a strong incentive to prescribe more 
                                                 
11 Gupta et al. find that the association between child deaths and public spending on health is twice as strong for the poor as 
for the non-poor. Rajkumar and Swaroop (2002) find that public spending on health is significantly associated with child 
and infant mortality reduction, but only for countries with good governance (as measured by a corruption index and a 




expensive treatments instead of the standard, recommended drug regimens, since the health worker 
both prescribes and dispenses drugs. To take one particularly important example, a number of studies 
in India have documented the inefficiency of private expenditures on tuberculosis treatments (Duggal 
1989; Uplekar 1989; Van der Veen 1991; Bhat 1993). 
Finally, it is important to note that the benefits of increased public spending on health are not 
restricted to health outcomes alone. Public health spending protects both poor and non-poor 
households from the financial impact of unanticipated health shocks and also serves to redistribute 
incomes to the poor who are most likely to be encumbered by out-of-pocket payments for health. A 
recent study finds that India has one of the highest incidence of catastrophic health payments among 
Asian countries (van Doorslaer, O'Donnell et al. 2006).12 Nearly 25 percent of Indian households 
report spending 5 percent or more of their total annual expenditure on out-of-pocket health payments; 
for 10 percent of households, out-of-pocket health payments exceed 10 percent of total expenditure. 
III. What Services Should The NRHM Purchase? 
An important decision for the NRHM is on how to use the additional resources available to effectively 
improve health in the 18 EAG states. A number of well-tested, cost-effective interventions exist that 
can address the high burden of maternal, under-five mortality, and infectious disease-related morbidity 
and mortality (Laxminarayan, Mills et al. 2006).  
However, it is important to focus on a smaller subset of interventions that can be financed by 
the government and scaled up effectively for several reasons. First, much of the impact of public 
spending on health can be attributed to a handful of high-impact interventions, such as childhood 
immunizations. A similar set of health conditions are responsible for a significant proportion of the 
burden of disease in both EAG and non-EAG states, although their individual rank in terms of burden 
may differ between these states (see Table 1 for leading causes of death in India). Second, formulating 
a simple package can be more effective than paying for a large range of health interventions without 
regard to joint costs or shared use of inputs (Bobadilla, Cowley et al. 1994). These minimum packages 
have other advantages – simplifying planning of new investments in building and manpower, defining 
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calculated as the proportion of households for whom out-of-pocket health payments exceed some threshold of total 
household consumption expenditure. The most commonly-used threshold is 10 percent, since beyond this level of out-of-





a minimum set of necessary inputs (such as vaccines, manpower etc), estimating financial needs, and 
establishing boundaries so that it is clear to citizens exactly what the government will and will not pay 
for. This last point is particularly important in a situation where bribes are often needed to elicit 
attention from government health providers when consumers (especially the poor) are not clear on 
what they are entitled to without payment. An additional benefit is in being able to clearly measure 
whether or not the minimum package is available in a given area and what the bottlenecks are to 
expanding access. Finally, only a small set of high-impact interventions can be delivered to scale in a 
weak health system; a large number of interventions will have the effect of disrupting already-fragile 
delivery systems, whereas success with a more manageable starting selection of interventions creates 
the institutional capacity – through ‘learning by doing’ – to expand  later. 
Minimum packages have been used effectively in Tanzania (Finlay, Law et al. 1995), Mexico 
and other countries. The cost of a basic package of health services that would address many of these 
interventions is between $12 per capita in 1994 dollars (Bobadilla, Cowley et al. 1994) and a more 
recent estimate of $30-40 per capita that also includes antiretroviral treatment for HIV/AIDS 
(Commission on Macroeconomics and Health 2001).  
Selecting the minimum set of interventions that should be provided by NRHM may be 
influenced by political and social considerations, but should also be guided by epidemiological and 
economic rationale. Here we discuss criteria to guide the choice of interventions to include in a 
minimum package and propose a minimum set of interventions that should be provided free of charge 
in all rural areas through the NRHM. While there may be compelling reasons to diverge from this list 
(such as a desire to help scheduled tribe populations in remote areas, for instance), our purpose is to 
sensitize policy makers to the opportunity cost of choosing less cost-effective interventions.  
NRHM should focus on interventions that generate maximum levels of health gain and 
financial protection. Target interventions should address disease conditions that are major sources of 
under-five mortality and burden from infectious diseases, especially among the poor. Currently, most 
government spending tends to benefit the relatively well-off (see Figure 13). This pattern is reflected in 
actual levels of service delivery as shown in Panel A of Figures 14 (for immunization) and 15 (for 
births in health facilities).  
A benefit incidence analysis for India found that wealthier sections of the population had better 
access to high-quality care (Mahal, Singh et al. 2002). This is because the wealthy typically have both 
greater bargaining power as well as easier geographical access to medical facilities. Since health-care 
is a normal good, the rich typically consume more of it, which is another reason why the distribution of 




A more equitable distribution of subsidies would have to both (i) increase spending on primary 
health-care facilities that tend to be predominantly utilized by lower income groups, and (ii) ensure 
greater geographical access.13 This more equitable distribution of outcomes would result from a policy 
of explicit universalization of services important to the poor. Panel B in Figures 14 and 15 illustrate the 
favorable distributional consequences of not targeting the poor per se but rather of universally 
providing services important to the poor (and primarily used by the poor). India’s ongoing and 
apparently-successful universalization of elementary education provides an example. 
The basic set of interventions that have the potential to address the greatest burden of illness at 
lowest cost in EAGA and non-EAGA states is described in Tables 2 and 3. It includes 
institutionalization of births to prevent maternal mortality (largely caused by hemorrhaging); 
expansion of immunization coverage for new-borns; access to oral rehydration salts, rotavirus 
vaccination, and vitamin A supplementation; case management of acute respiratory infections for 
children under five; expanded coverage of DOTS strategy for detection and treatment of tuberculosis; 
condom use promotion and expanded access to voluntary counseling and testing to prevent 
transmission of HIV use of HPV vaccine and cervical cancer screening; and spraying and vector 
control for vector-borne diseases such as malaria, dengue, and chikungunya. Our preliminary estimate 
of the cost of this intervention package is $5-6 per capita excluding the cost interventions to prevent 
and treat cardiovascular disease. 
IV. How Should Services Be Provided In Low-Capacity Settings? 
Thus far, we have addressed the issue of financing health and said little about the issue of provision of 
service. Most, if not all, of the interventions discussed here are within the scope of basic health service 
facilities but even these may be missing in the most remote parts of Bihar, Jharkhand or Chattisgarh. 
Poor service delivery at government facilities is the main reason why most patients seeking care turn to 
the private sector. While these are issues discussed at greater length in DCPP-India, it is worth a brief 
treatment here. 
Figure 16 shows that only 22 percent of all outpatient treatments in the rural areas were 
obtained from public providers in 2004, with hardly any change in this share since 1995-96 (19 
percent). In Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, the public share in outpatient health contacts was merely 5-10 
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percent, with Bihar actually experiencing a decline in the share of outpatient treatments obtained from 
public providers. Interestingly, the dominance of the private sector in outpatient treatments does not 
appear to be correlated with state income per capita. Nor, as previously noted for the example of 
tuberculosis, is private care associated with quality (as opposed to convenience). In Orissa and 
Rajasthan, which also are relatively poor states, nearly one-half of all outpatient contacts were with the 
public sector. The share of public providers in inpatient care is much greater than in outpatient care. 
However, nationally, private hospitals and nursing homes still account for the majority (58 percent) of 
all hospitalizations.  
Given the often poor performance of both the public and the private sectors, especially in EAG 
states, one faces two choices, not necessarily mutually exclusive. One is to improve public-sector 
performance and the other is to leverage the private sector that is already providing a significant share 
of outpatient services. 
A. Improving Public-Sector Performance 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to address the issue of how to improve the service-delivery 
performance of the public sector. In any case, much has been written on this topic already. What is 
important to bear in mind, however, is that (i) seldom will additional financial resources suffice by 
themselves in achieving the desired health outcomes, and (ii) the nature of the financial instruments 
employed in the health sector can affect the incentives for better performance within the public sector. 
In this paper, we merely point to several financial approaches for improving public-sector performance 
that have been discussed in the literature. 
First is the question of what the public sector should finance. This paper advocates going 
beyond the public financing of activities that have significant positive externalities. It supports the idea 
of universal public financing for an initially-limited set of clinical interventions. DCPP-India’s main 
purpose has been to help inform decision-makers on the selection of interventions by (i) delineating 
what mixes of incremental services are feasible within alternative budget scenarios, and (ii) assessing 
how much health care can be purchased for different elements of the mix. Section 3 of this paper has 
already summarized DCPP-India’s relevant finding from the perspective of finance. 
The second question relates to the cross-sectoral issues associated with public-sector 
management and service delivery (World Bank, 2005). Local accountability and voice are important 
themes. Another related theme concerns the importance of demand-side finance, particularly for 
reaching the poor. One can think of this approach as involving negative user fees, and there has been 




incentives for the poor to invest more in education or health than they would otherwise be inclined to 
do. This can lead to fuller and more efficient use of inputs. Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA), for 
example, includes midday meals explicitly to generate incentives for school attendance. An important 
lesson from this line of writing is to identify ways to increase the range of choice and the range of 
control exercised by service users. Another general lesson concerns the importance of protecting 
budgets for supplies. Still another is the importance of investing and disseminating information on 
outcomes so that both providers and consumers of service have benchmarks to judge performance. 
Finally, the World Bank has argued [since at least the time of its World Development Report 1993 on 
health (World Bank 1993)] that introducing competition to and among public-sector providers can 
improve responsiveness and efficiency in delivering health services. This can be viewed as one 
approach to empowering consumers. Obviously, its applicability is limited in areas of low population 
density and/or few service providers. 
Third, one of the most important ways for improving public-sector performance in health 
service delivery is to generate and distribute timely, locally-specific information on financial transfers, 
on the effective coverage of interventions, and on selected health outcomes. The Registrar-General of 
India is already developing capacity for this. Panchayati raj institutions and service providers should be 
encouraged to use this information to increase accountability for performance and to monitor progress 
in improving performance. 
There are yet other lessons for improving health service delivery that have been discussed in 
the literature. Peabody et al. (2006) summarize these in the context of low- and middle-income 
countries: 
•  Generate and encourage the use of specific clinical algorithms based on evidence of best 
practice. 
•  Have service providers acquire skill and speed by doing a few things frequently rather than 
many things occasionally. Learning by doing is key to improving performance. This lesson is 
very relevant for India given the hard reality that, at least initially, the NRHM mission will 
have resources only for a limited set of high-priority items. 
•  Improve provider incentives by creating a legal and ethical environment where-care providers 
do not profit personally from the sale of drugs, diagnostic procedures, or provision or referral 
of care. Overuse and misuse of resources typically flourish in such unethical environments. 
It goes without saying that the instruments for facilitating better quality of private health care require 




B. Leveraging the Private Sector 
The large reliance on the private sector for health services, particularly by the poor, should be viewed 
in the context of the largely unregulated nature of the market for health services in India. Although 
there are numerous laws governing private practice, there is little enforcement of these laws. As a 
result, private health providers are not held to any minimum quality-of-care standards, and there is a 
great deal of unevenness in the quality of health services offered. As a rule, the less educated and 
informed the potential patient base, the more likely it is for private health providers of dubious quality 
and qualifications to enter and operate in the market. Of course, many public providers are equally 
negligent in offering any semblance of quality care. Indeed, the widespread reliance on the private 
sector for health care ultimately reflects the failure of the public sector in India to finance and provide 
adequate and quality health services. 
The challenge of transforming the current private market for health care into a regulated market 
where there is better assurance of quality is significant, and there are no easy solutions. Experiences 
from other low and middle income countries in this regard are summarized elsewhere (see 
Laxminarayan et al 2006) but one arrangement – contracting out management of government health 
services to non-governmental organizations with specified targets for service quality – is worth 
mentioning here.  
A study of contracting in Cambodia found that outcomes improved significantly in 
performance indicators such as availability of 24-hour service, reduced provider absence, and 
increased supervisory visits in districts where services were contracted relative to control districts 
(Bloom, King et al. 2006). The program involved greater levels of government expenditures but some 
of these increases were offset by a decrease in private spending for health. While this approach may be 
relatively demanding of institutional capacity, successes elsewhere and within India point to the 
potential for India to benefit from contracting-out some services.14 In general, the more explicit and 
well-defined the service package to be contracted out, the greater is the accountability among 
contractors.  
                                                 
14 For instance, the Karuna Health Trust (www.karunatrust.org) runs 25 PHC's in all the districts of the state of Karnataka 




V. The Mechanics of Financing Health 
A. Center-State Issues in Public Spending on Health 
Since health is a ‘state subject’ in India, most of the responsibility for health interventions and 
expenditure rests with state governments. At the same time, the central government is an important 
player in certain types of health programs, especially those of a preventive nature. To complicate 
matters further, the government has emphasized the devolution of health service delivery to elected 
local governments, called the panchayati raj institutions (PRI), although this has proceeded very 
unevenly across states.15 Thus, it is important to consider the nexus of health financing arrangements 
between different levels of government when analyzing public spending on health in India. 
Overall, the central government accounts for about a quarter of all public spending on health in 
the country. The bulk of the remainder is spent by state governments, with negligible financing by 
local governments. However, there are large variations across states in the central-state split in 
expenditure. As observed in Figure 17 (which is based on data from six states for which reliable data 
are available), central government grants accounted for as little as 14 percent of total government 
health (revenue) expenditure in West Bengal but as much as 23 percent in Andhra Pradesh in 1999-
2000. Further, there was virtually no change in the central share of government health expenditure 
between 1991-92 and 1999-2000. 
Figure 17 demonstrates another important characteristic of the central-state divide in public 
spending on health in India: even though the central government’s role in overall health spending is 
modest, it plays a dominant role in financing public health and family welfare (viz., family planning 
and reproductive health) activities. Much of this expenditure is on vertical centrally-sponsored 
communicable disease programs (such as the National Vector-Borne Disease Program, Leprosy 
Eradication Program, Tuberculosis Control Program, and AIDS/STD Control Program) and the Family 
Welfare Program. In Rajasthan, for example, the central grants accounted for 70 percent of total 
government health expenditure in 1999-2000. Even in West Bengal, the central share in public health 
                                                 
15 Karnataka and Kerala are two states where there has been considerable devolution of health service delivery and health 
expenditure to PRIs. Indeed, in Kerala, local health workers are not only employed by local governments, but also 
accountable to them. In other states, even though PRIs receive funds to pay district- and lower-level health worker salaries, 




and family welfare expenditure was 55 percent. Even more worrisome is the fact that the state 
government’s role in financing public health activities has declined over time.16 
B.Outcome-Oriented Financing 
Much of the state-level spending on health is on the provision of medical services, typically curative 
services in hospitals. The functional distribution of state government health expenditure in 1999-2000, 
shown in Figure 18, shows that between one-half and three-quarters of state government expenditure 
went toward medical services. With the sole exception of Karnataka, the share spent on public health 
activities ranged between 6 and 15 percent. Some of the poorest states, like Bihar, Rajasthan and Uttar 
Pradesh, devoted 10 percent or less of their expenditure to public health activities. 
This is unfortunate since the DCPP-I suggests that health outcomes, especially infant mortality 
outcomes, are much more responsive to public health and local clinical interventions than to the 
provision of curative services in hospitals. In addition, evidence from several countries, including 
India, indicates that public spending on immunizations and preventive care is much more pro-poor 
than that on hospital-based curative services. For instance, Mahal et al. find that the bottom two 
consumption quintiles received 47 percent of the public subsidy for immunizations in India but less 
than 20 percent of the public subsidy for hospitals (Mahal, Singh et al. 2002; Mahal, Yazbeck et al. 
2002). 
Thus, an important public policy challenge is to increasingly shift the responsibility of public 
health and family welfare funding from the central government to the state governments. One way in 
which this could be accomplished would be for central grants to be made as matching grants, so that 
the states spending more of their own resources on public health and family welfare activities could 
qualify for larger central grants.17 The SSA program for universalization of elementary education in 
India provides an example that we discuss further in the next section.  
Another example is offered by the Local Government Performance Program (LGPP) 
implemented since 1999 in the Philippines. Under this program, the federal Department of Health 
                                                 
16 As noted in the note to Figure 17, these data should be treated as broadly indicative, since the ‘public health and family 
welfare’ category includes several expenditures (e.g., health education, drug control) that have little to do with public 
health, and excludes expenditures on water and sanitation by the Panchayati Raj institutions. In addition, in some states, 
health-worker salaries account for nearly 90 percent of government health expenditure. 
17 Some of the disease control programs are partially funded on matching grant basis, but most of the others are fully 




encourages local governments to increase allocation and expenditures on preventive health programs 
through a “match” or counterpart funding. The matching grants are accompanied by technical 
assistance, and are designed to improve the capability of local governments to expand service delivery 
and to achieve significant increases in rates of immunized children, vitamin A supplementation, 
tetatnus toxoid immunization for women as well as in the use of modern contraceptive methods 
(Palabrica-Costello et al. 2003). 
While matching grants could create the right incentives for states to increase their absolute and 
relative spending on communicable disease control and preventive health activities, they could also 
place a large burden on the poor, high-mortality states that do not have the fiscal wherewithal to 
significantly increase their public spending on health. 
Another way to motivate states to alter the functional composition of their spending on health 
might be through greater use of ‘outcome budgeting’ in the country. For the first time ever in India’s 
history, the Finance Minister, Mr. P. Chidambaram, presented an ‘outcome budget’ in India’s 
Parliament on Aug 25, 2005. As its name implies, the outcome budget introduces outcome- or 
performance-orientation in the budget process, seeking to convert financial outlays into physical 
outcomes, with measurable and monitorable targets. The idea – revolutionary by Government of India 
standards – is that ministries and state governments will be held accountable for their budget 
allocations and will have to deliver performance (i.e., attainment of targeted outcomes) to justify their 
budgetary allocations. If central health grants to the states are made contingent on improvement in 
measurable health outcome indicators, there would be a strong incentive for state governments to 
adjust the functional composition of their health spending so as to bring about rapid improvements in 
health outcomes. The Registrar-General of India already has substantial capacity for objective 
measurement of health outcomes, and this could be built on.  
VI. Potential Lessons from Other Sectors and Other Countries 
The institutional arrangements being established under the NRHM will influence the nature of health 
finance in India for decades to come. Do the experiences of other sectors in India, and of other 
countries, provide potential lessons for health finance in India? Certainly, the circumstances of these 
other experiences differ substantially from the issues facing health finance in India today. Yet, there 
may be some relevance from other experiences and we describe three: India’s National Program of 
Universal Elementary Education (Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan or SSA), launched in 2001; India’s Public 
Distribution System for Food (PDS); and China’s successfully implemented health finance reform of 




A. Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA) – India’s Universalization of Elementary Education 
In 2001, the GOI initiated a program to universalize elementary education – primary schooling by 
2007 and upper primary by 2010. These goals exceed the MDG for primary education both in terms of 
timing and of amount of education for each child. For a more complete discussion of the Sarva Shiksha 
Abhiyan (SSA) see (World Bank 2004; Wu, Kaul et al. 2005). 
SSA began in 2001 from a base of substantial previous experimentation and investment, 
beginning with the landmark 1986 National Policy on Education. Prior to this, public expenditures had 
(successfully) focused on creation of elite tertiary institutions. Budgetary allocations reflected the 1986 
policy change:  public expenditures on primary education grew by 0.4 percent of GDP between 1993 
and 2001 (from 1.7 to 2.1 percent), whereas expenditures on other levels increased by only 0.1 percent 
of GDP (from 1.9 percent to 2.0 percent). 
SSA will, in its initial phase, increase public spending on elementary education by an additional 
0.2 percent per year. Extending universalization to upper primary will cost more. A substantial portion 
of incremental spending on SSA is budgeted through a so-called $3.5 billion sector-wide approach 
(SWAP) operation involving external partners (IDA, DfID and the EU), state governments, and the 
Union government. The financing shares are as follows: union government 45 percent, state 
governments 25 percent, and external partners 30 percent. It is noteworthy that, in the push for 
universalization, the Union government’s financial share, relative to the states, far exceeds its overall 
share in education finance. 
Originally planned as a three-year effort beginning in 2004, this SWAP disbursed most of its 
commitment in two years. Rapid disbursement resulted in part through the financial intermediation of 
‘State Implementation Societies’ as fund holders. These Societies were staffed in part by seconded and 
retired IRS officers and served as a mechanism for strengthening implementation and disbursement 
capacity at the local level. While evaluation results are not yet available, it appears likely that 
substantial enrollment increases occurred in hitherto excluded subgroups of the population – girls, 
scheduled castes and scheduled tribes. 
Several lessons for health finance in general and the NRHM in particular seem plausible: 
•  Public sector expenditures on elementary education increased, through deliberate policy, by 
about 0.6 percent of GDP in about 12 years. While 0.6 percent is less ambitious than what is 




•  The effect of a policy of universalization is to differentially benefit disadvantaged groups. 
Implementation probably will require a much more substantial GOI financial role relative to the 
States than is true for other health-sector operations. 
•  External finance can be arranged on terms that are much more under GOI control than had 
typically been the case. 
B. PDS – India’s Public Distribution System for Food 
Until June, 1997, the Indian government had a public distribution system (PDS) for selected foods that 
provided universal coverage for its intended benefits. At that time, the government changed the 
program to (partially) target the poor, and in 2000 the subsidy element for the non-poor was 
completely removed. Kochar (2005) provides a clear overview of the evolution of the program and an 
evaluation of the consequences of moving away from universal provision of benefits. The theoretical 
rationale for targeting is straightforward: in view of tight fiscal constraints, targeting benefits allows 
some combination of lower fiscal burden and higher unit benefits to those most in need. However, 
Kochar’s evaluation found the political economy to differ from the theory: village elites lost interest in 
making the PDS work and leakages undermined attempts to target the poor. These findings accord 
clearly with those of Lindert (2004) for programs in high-income countries. 
It is debatable whether public subsidies of basic foodstuffs serve a useful function. What the 
PDS experience suggests is that if the government decides in favor of such subsidies, there are strong 
practical arguments for universalizing the benefits. Although the specific circumstances of the NRHM 
differ from those of the PDS, and targeting to the rural areas of EAG states is likely to prove feasible, 
the PDS experiences provides an additional argument for universalization of benefits within states. 
C. China’s Health Finance Reform of the Early 1980s 
By the late 1970s, China had succeeded in providing some degree of health insurance to an estimated 
71 percent of its population and was spending about 3 percent of GDP on health overall (World Bank, 
1997). About 0.6 percent of the 3 percent was out-of-pocket payment and the remaining 2.4 percent 
was a mix of government and government-mandated finance. Included in the government-mandated 
portion, but only a small part of it, was the ‘rural cooperative medical system’ (RCMS) which provided 
real but minimal health insurance to almost 50 percent of China’s population. Almost all the finance 
for the RCMS was locally generated and the level of coverage correspondingly varied with the great 
variation in local income levels. Health indicators in China in 1980 greatly exceeded those of countries 




Beginning in 1978, China introduced major changes in economic policy to decrease the role of 
central planning and increase the role of market forces. In rural areas, the accompanying transition 
from agricultural collectives to household control greatly increased rural incomes but weakened the 
financial base for the RCMS by, essentially, making participation no longer mandatory. Peasants were 
encouraged to take responsibility for financing their own health care. Facilities and providers, in both 
rural and urban areas, were encouraged to rely on user fees to support their operations. These reforms 
were successfully implemented – in the sense that out-of-pocket payment for services rose 
dramatically and the RCMS declined in importance. By 1993 RCMS coverage had dropped from 48 
percent of the population to 7 percent, and by 2003 out-of-pocket payments had risen to 56 percent of 
total expenditures. Total expenditures as a percent of GDP had themselves almost doubled (to 5.6 
percent) in a period in which GDP had itself approximately quadrupled. While health indicators in 
China improved slightly over this period, they improved at a less rapid pace than in most other 
countries. (For example while India’s life expectancy increased by 5 years between 1990 and 2002, 
China’s increased by only 2 – World Bank, 2004.) 
Although China’s reform was successfully implemented, its consequences were unfortunate – 
rapid cost growth, dramatic declines in insurance coverage, and a slowed rate of improvement in health 
outcomes. A likely key policy direction of China’s current movement toward a ‘harmonious society’ 
will be to attempt to reverse important elements of previous reforms. Are there potential lessons for 
India in this experience? We draw the following two conclusions from China’s experience: 
•  reliance on private finance risks excluding large proportions of the population and leads to 
potential for rapid cost growth. 
•  Fee-for-service mechanisms for provided payment have led to well-documented abuses in 
China and have also contributed to cost growth. 
China’s experience lends support to the current direction of health finance policy in India – that of 
increased government responsibility. 
VII. Conclusions and Main Messages 
A number of important findings have appeared throughout this paper and, in this concluding section, 
we draw them together. 
1. Focus on a few select interventions. 
The NRHM should focus on a small set of highly cost-effective interventions. This facilitates scaling 




interventions permits universal financial access to those services in targeted states or districts, with 
important political economy benefits. The DCP-India provides a rigorous assessment of what 
interventions might best be included in an ‘Initial Health Entitlement Program,’ and the analysis in this 
paper suggests the cost to be on the order of US$7 per capita per year or, for an all-India program, 
about 1 percent of GDP. While substantial, this is less than envisioned for the NRHM. 
2. The dominant source of finance for rural health in the EAG states in the immediate future will be 
public.  
Although worthy of further assessment and experimentation, community finance appears unlikely to 
play a significant role, especially in the EAG states (see Text Box 4). User fees have generally been 
incapable of raising more than a modest share (10-15 percent) of total finance and would require 
administratively unworkable targeting of exemptions for poor households. [Indeed the World Bank’s 
World Development Report on delivering services to the poor (World Bank, 2005) makes (at some 
points) strong arguments for cash transfers to service users – i.e., conditional cash transfers or negative 
user fees – in regions with large populations in poverty in order to draw the poor into utilizing 
services.] A partial exception might be modest fees for drugs to facilitate supply. External aid (IDA, 
EU, DfID, Norway, foundations) could play a supportive role and, if the NRHM were carefully 
presented, could have the effect of increasing the overall availability of concessional external finance 
to India. Although potentially worth pursuing, the fraction of required finance that could be generated 
externally would be modest. So, by exclusion, public finance will play the central role. Financing a 1 
percent, and ultimately 2 percent, of GDP increase in public finance of health will require careful 
attention to generating the requisite fiscal space (Hemming and Ter-Minassian 2004; Heller 2005). 
3. Focus more sharply on states and districts of greatest need. 
Although the NRHM proposes to focus on 18 states, this may be too many and some states may not 
belong in this list. For instance, Himachal Pradesh has one of the highest state GDP per capita in the 
country (Rs. 24,209 in 2001-02, as compared to Rs. 5,592 in Bihar), has relatively good health 
indicators in comparison to most states, and has the highest public expenditure on health as a share of 
its GSDP (2 percent). As such, there is little reason to include Himachal Pradesh in the initial phase of 
the NRHM. This initial phase could be targeted to the four states (UP, MP, Bihar and Rajasthan) that 
together account for more than one-half of all the infant deaths in the country. Likewise, it is not 
necessary to target NRHM interventions to all the districts in these states. If the results from the 
National Family Health Survey can be extrapolated nationally, an intervention program that initially 




(out of a total of 602 districts) would be more effective than one that is spread thinly over all the 602 
districts. 
4. Introduce incentive-based structures to motivate state governments to achieve desired financial and 
health outcomes. 
Given the dominant role of the states in financing health in India, it is critical for the states, particularly 
the EAG states, to increase their health spending concomitantly with the NRHM. This will require 
creative incentives, not only in the form of matching grants but also in the form of performance- and 
outcome-based grants from the central government. This is particularly relevant in the context of the 
government’s stated shift toward ‘outcome budgeting.’ The education sector’s SSA provides valuable 
precedent for increasing state budgetary commitments. The incentive came from increased GOI (and 
external) financial commitments and, hence, a substantial increase in GOI’s share in finance of 
elementary education. A similar increase will probably be necessary in health. 
5. Utilize centrally-sponsored schemes where they are now working. 
Although the funding for many of NRHM’s interventions, particularly clinical interventions, will come 
from states (or flow through states from federal matching grants), there already exist a number of 
national programs for delivering key interventions (such as immunizations, TB treatment, and AIDS 
prevention). The existing organizational and financial structures should, in these cases, be provided 
with expanded funding and be the key vehicles for NRHM implementation. 
6. Improve information availability and local oversight. 
One of the most important ways for improving public-sector performance in service delivery will be to 
generate and distribute timely, locally-specific information on financial transfers, on the effective 
coverage of interventions, and on selected health outcomes. The Registrar-General of India is already 
developing capacity for this. Panchayat raj institutions and service providers should be encouraged to 
use this information to increase accountability for performance and to monitor progress in improving 
it. 
7. A significant challenge in EAG states is how the government spends its money.  
While the evidence presented in this paper presents a strong case for ramping up public-sector 
spending on health in India, it is critically important that serious attention be paid to improving the 
quality of this additional spending. The NRHM should focus on the reason for the low level of 
utilization of primary health facilities in the EAG states – viz., the lack of availability of medicines and 
other inputs as well as poor incentives for health-care personnel to report for work and to be held 




finance, some need to be addressed by specific capacity-building efforts, including, initially, through 
greater GOI involvement in implementation in weaker states. In this context, it is important to bear in 
mind that public finance of services need not entail public delivery and that the private and NGO 
sector may have an important role in the delivery of some NRHM-financed services. 
Likewise, it is important that the ASHA program be designed differently from the various health 
functionary programs tried out at the village level over the last three or four decades (e.g., Auxiliary 
Nurse Midwives, Lady Health Visitors, Village Health Guides, anganwadi worker, etc.). Many of these 
schemes have failed to make much of a dent in rural health outcomes, in some part because they did 
not have the right incentives in place to make the village health workers accountable to the community. 
Currently, the plan is for ASHAs to be accountable to the village panchayats and for their 
compensation to be linked to their performance. How these employment contract details are 
operationalized will have an important bearing on the eventual success of the ASHA program. 
To conclude, the vision presented in this paper is one of focusing resources tightly on interventions of 
importance to the health and financial protection of the poor. Within states or districts, there would be 
public finance for all for these services. There is a pragmatic reason for this: selecting the poor for fee 
exemptions is difficult or very costly, and political support follows from broad access. 
 
 
Text Box 1: The National Rural Health Mission 
 
The goals of the NRHM are as follows: 
 
•  Reduction in IMR to 30 per 1,000 live births by 2012  
•  Reduction of maternal mortality rate to 100/100,000 by 2012. Universal access to public health 
services, including women’s health, child health, water, sanitation and hygiene, immunization, 
and nutrition.  
•  Reduction in mortality due to malaria, dengue and Kalazar; Filaria elimination 2015.  
•  46 lakh cataract operations by 2012. 
•  Access to integrated comprehensive primary health care. 




•  Revitalize local health traditions and mainstream AYUSH. 
•  Promotion of healthy life styles. 
•  85 percent cure rate under TB DOTs. 
•  TFR reduced to 2.1 by 2012. 
•  Upgrading CHCs to IPHS; Increased utilization of FRUs from 20 percent to 75 percent; 





Text Box 2: Will Economic Growth Lead to Mortality Decline in India? 
 
An important policy question is the extent to which health indicators are likely to improve with income 
growth. Based on cross-country evidence, Pritchett and Summers (1996) argued that infant and child 
mortality are strongly responsive to income, with infant and child mortality declining by 2-4 percent 
for every 10 percent increase in income per capita. Much earlier, Preston (1975) had plotted the cross-
country relationship between average life expectancy at birth and GDP per capita for three different 
time periods: 1900s, 1930s, and 1960s. He, too, had found a strong relationship between life 
expectancy and national income per capita but one that was changing over time.  
If health outcomes in India are similarly responsive to income changes, health conditions in 
India could be expected to improve independently of large public investments in health, given the rapid 
growth (7-9 percent annually) of the Indian economy. The ‘Preston’ curves for India – i.e., the 
association between infant mortality and per capita income – are shown in Figure 20 with cross-state 
data for three time periods: 1981, 1991, and 2003. Like Preston, we find that the relationship between 
infant mortality and state GDP per capita has shifted down over time, reflecting the importance of 
mortality reductions unrelated to income (e.g., advances in medical technology, expansion of female 
adult literacy, and large public health campaigns). A state with a per capita GDP of Rs. 6,000 (in 
constant 1993-94 Rupees) would have seen its infant mortality decline from a level of 100 deaths per 
1,000 live births in 1981 to 70 deaths without any increase in its per capita income. 
But unlike Preston, we find that the infant mortality-per capita state GDP curve has become 
flatter over time, suggesting that infant mortality is considerably less responsive to income in 2003 
than it was in 1981. Our conclusion is broadly consistent with that of Measham, et al. (1999). This 
means that economic growth alone is less likely to bring about large declines in infant mortality in the 





Text Box 3: Effects of Out-of-Pocket Health Care Payments 
 
Health care, especially for catastrophic illnesses, is very expensive. Uninsured households cope with 
the large unexpected expenses associated with catastrophic illnesses by cutting back on other 
consumption, drawing down assets, and or by borrowing. Indeed, many qualitative studies in 
developing countries have identified health shocks as a leading cause of impoverishment of 
households.  
The vulnerability of households to poverty due to a health shock is naturally greater when 
households are uninsured and finance most health-care expenditures themselves. Reliance on out-of-
pocket payments for funding health care generally declines with per capita GDP, although there are 
large differences across countries at roughly comparable levels of income. The concept of catastrophic 
health expenditure has been proposed as a means of estimating the vulnerability of households to large 
health shocks. The measure is calculated as the percent of households for whom out-of-pocket health 
payments exceed some threshold of household total expenditure (Berki 1986; Pradhan and Prescott 
2002; Wagstaff and van Doorslaer 2003).18 Figure 21 shows India as having one of the highest 
incidence of catastrophic health payments among Asian countries (van Doorslaer, O'Donnell et al. 
2006). Nearly 25 percent of all households report spending 5 percent or more of their total annual 
expenditure on out-of-pocket health payments; for 10 percent of households, out-of-pocket health 
payments exceed 10 percent of total expenditure.  
Another way to gauge the effect of large out-of-pocket health payments on household well-
being is to examine the increase in the incidence of poverty when such payments are excluded from the 
calculation of household consumption expenditure. The standard measure of consumption poverty 
assumes that all household health expenditure is discretionary. This means that a household facing a 
large and unanticipated out-of-pocket payment for health care is considered non-poor simply because 
that payment pushes its total consumption expenditure above the poverty line. Using household survey 
data from 11 countries, Van Doorslaer et al. (2006) have calculated the increase in the poverty head-
count as a result of excluding out-of-pocket payments for health care (van Doorslaer, O'Donnell et al. 
2006). Their results, shown in Figure 22, indicate that India and Bangladesh experience some of the 
                                                 
18 The most commonly-used threshold is 10 percent; it is assumed in the literature that beyond this threshold of out-of-
pocket payments, a household has to borrow, forfeit other basic needs, liquidate valuable assets, or become impoverished 




largest increases in absolute poverty (using the $1 a day international poverty line) when out-of-pocket 
health-care payments are excluded from total consumption expenditure. India’s poverty head-count 
rises from 31 percent to 35 percent, pushing an additional 4 percent of the population into poverty 
when health expenditure is excluded from total expenditure.19 Not surprisingly, Figure 21 also 
suggests a positive association between the increase in poverty due to out-of-pocket payments and the 
out-of-pocket share in total health expenditure in a country. 
 
                                                 
19 Of course, all of the estimates shown in Figure 21 are likely to be overestimates, since not all household health 




Text Box 4: Risk-Pooling and Community-Financing Mechanisms 
 
There has been a great deal of interest in recent years, both in India and in other developing countries, 
in community risk-pooling and social insurance schemes. Community-based health insurance schemes 
have emerged in a number of settings as a way of spreading catastrophic health risks by transferring 
funds from high- to low-income groups and from low- to high-risk individuals within a community. 
Such schemes work best when the individuals to be covered are members of a closely-defined 
community (e.g., members of a cooperative or union). A number of health professionals and policy 
makers have advocated community-based health insurance schemes as a solution to the health-care 
financing problems of low-income countries. 
There are a large number of community-based health insurance schemes that operate in India. 
Most of these schemes are organized by NGOs and community organizations, and are relatively small 
in terms of their coverage. Some of the better-known ones include SEWA, Karuna Trust (Karnataka), 
Mayapur (West Bengal), and KKVS (Theni district, Tamil Nadu) (Dave 1997; Ransom 2002; ILO 
2005). One of the most successful and publicized community-based health insurance schemes is the 
one established since 1992 by the Self-Employed Women’s Association (SEWA) in Gujarat. SEWA 
offers an integrated social security scheme to its members and their husbands and children (the cover 
for husbands and children was added in 2002), providing coverage for life, asset loss, widowhood, 
personal accident, sickness, and maternity benefits. As of 2006, approximately 150,000 individuals are 
covered by the scheme, virtually all of them in Gujarat. 
The success of community risk-pooling health insurance schemes depends critically on 
defining the benefits that insured individuals will receive. These benefits obviously are closely tied to 
the availability of viable health providers in the community. If defined health benefits are too small (as 
is often the case) or health providers offering quality health services simply do not exist in a 
community, there will be little demand for health insurance and prepayment schemes in the population, 
as individuals will not see any value in paying premiums for services of dubious quality.  
Successful schemes also try to enroll as many members as they can, so that there is greater risk 
pooling. Often, community-based health insurance schemes limit coverage to the poor, since their 
purpose is to protect the poor from catastrophic health shocks. However, the low degree of risk pooling 
inherent in limited membership amplifies the risk of adverse selection into the scheme and reduces the 
financial viability of the scheme. To be financially viable, the schemes need to enroll the poor as well 




While many of the individual micro-insurance schemes in India have been successful, their 
success can often be traced to the leadership of a community leader or the strong organizational and 
management capacity of an NGO. Thus, it is not at all clear whether these schemes are replicable and 
can be scaled-up. A careful study of several community-based health insurance schemes in Asia and 
Africa concludes that “…even if individual schemes achieve their own objectives (in terms of equity, 
efficiency etc.), this does not necessarily imply that such objectives will be achieved at the system 
level” (Bennett 2004). Bennett argues that to date there is very limited understanding of how 
community-based health insurance schemes interact with other elements of a health-care financing 
system. Until more evidence is available on this topic, it is premature to view these schemes as a cure-
all for the health financing problems of developing countries. 
In 2003, the Government of India announced a Universal Insurance Scheme (UIS) targeted at 
the poor. The UIS provides hospitalization benefits, but excludes conditions related to pregnancy and 
delivery. It charges a premium of Rs. 365 per year (“a rupee a day”) per individual, with discounts 
offered for groups and large families. Despite the fact that fairly attractive premium subsidies are 
offered to low-income individuals (e.g., subsidy of up to Rs. 200 for persons below the poverty line), 
the scheme has suffered from very low enrollment. The inability to generate sufficient demand for this 
scheme probably reflects the general paucity of health facilities offering reasonable-quality services in 
rural India and the consequent lack of confidence of consumers that they will receive good value for 
their premiums.  
The experience of Thailand is useful in this regard. Thailand is one of the few low- or middle-
income countries in the world that has a successful universal health coverage scheme that it introduced 
in 2001 (known as the “30 Baht Scheme” since the co-payment for any visit or hospital admission is 
Baht 30). While there are many reasons for the success of the Thai scheme, the scheme would not have 
been possible if successive governments in Thailand had not established comprehensive health 
infrastructure in the rural areas of the country, where two-thirds of the Thai population live. Over the 
last 40 years, the country has built an impressive network of functioning primary care health centers in 
all the sub-districts of the country and community hospitals in more than 90 percent of districts. In 
addition, an effective administrative system allowed the enrollment of 45 million people in the 
universal coverage scheme within months (Towse, Mills et al. 2004). Given India’s lack of a 
comprehensive network of rural health facilities that can actually deliver quality services, the odds of a 





Appendix: Health Outcomes And Public Spending 
 
Figure 23, which is based on 19 years of data for 13 major states in the country, shows the association 
between infant mortality rates and real public expenditure on health per capita. A strong inverse 
relationship is observed between the two variables, with the slope of the curve becoming less steep at 
higher levels of public spending on health.  
To explore this association further, we have estimated a more formal model of infant mortality 
– a regression of infant mortality on real public expenditure on health per capita with control for gross 
state domestic product per capita (GSDP), time trends, and unobserved state-specific (but time-
invariant) effects. The regression results are shown in Appendix Table 1.20,21 
To summarize the regression results, we find a strong association between infant mortality and 
government health expenditure per capita even after controlling for the other variables. Interestingly, 
the estimated effect on infant mortality of public spending on health is much stronger in the low-
income than in the high-income states. Figure 24 plots the estimated effect of per capita public 
expenditure on infant mortality reduction at differing levels of GSDP per capita. The results indicate 
that beyond a level of Rs. 11,000 (in constant 1993-94 Rupees) in GSDP per capita, additional public 
expenditure on health has a negligible effect on infant mortality. 
The empirical results are intuitive.22 The larger decline in infant mortality associated with an 
additional Rupee of public expenditure on health in the poor states reflects the fact that these states, 
                                                 
20 Data on government health expenditure were obtained from detailed budget demand documents of individual states. 
Expenditure on health includes spending on public health; urban and rural health services; medical education, training and 
research; general administration; and family welfare (i.e., population programs, including maternal and child health). It 
includes expenditure incurred by a state out of its own revenues as well as central government health allocations to that 
state. 
21 A state-level regression of infant mortality on public health spending is predicated on the assumption that public 
spending is not endogenously distributed across states (Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1986). Such an assumption may not always 
hold, especially if government health expenditures are allocated across states based on health conditions. However, the 
inclusion of state fixed effects in the regression effectively controls for endogenous program placement. We allow for a 
central planner to distribute public spending on health across states according to an unobserved health attribute; in other 
words, states that have innately high mortality may spend more on health than those having innately low mortality. Since 
the fixed-effects model purges the unobserved (time-invariant) health attribute from the model, it effectively addresses the 
endogenous program placement problem. 
22 There is some evidence in the existing literature to indicate that public spending on health matters more to health 
outcomes of the poor than of the non-poor. For instance, Bidani and Ravallion (1997) find an impact of public spending on 
health outcomes of the poor but not those of the non-poor. Likewise, Gupta et al. (1999) find a stronger inverse association 




which also happen to have high rates of infant mortality, have very low coverage – and hence 
substantial room for expansion – of basic low-cost child survival interventions, such as child 
immunization and oral rehydration therapy. In the better-off, low-mortality states, these basic 
interventions are already widespread, and infant mortality can only be further reduced through more 
expensive interventions, such as deliveries in medical institutions and post-delivery and emergency 
hospital-based care. Hence, a Rupee of public spending on health will typically have a greater effect on 
reducing infant mortality in the (poorer) high-mortality states than in the (richer) low-mortality states. 
The smaller health impact of public expenditure on health in the better-off states may also 
reflect the increasing role of the private sector in providing health inputs at higher income levels. In the 
poor states, not only is the private sector in health more limited in scope, but complementary 
household inputs into health production, such as nutrition and good hygiene, are also typically lacking. 
As a result, the public sector and public spending on health assume far more important roles in 
determining health outcomes than in the non-poor states. However, as per capita incomes in a state 
increase, nutrition and hygiene improve, as does the supply of better-quality private health providers, 
all of which diminish the relative importance of government health expenditure. 
These results should be treated are exploratory and subject to the following caveats. The 
correlation between IMR and public expenditure could be spurious if a third variable that was 
correlated with public expenditures in poorer states also had an effect on IMR. Identifying the effect of 
public expenditures on health would require much more detailed data on other factors influencing 
IMR. Further, there are potentially problems with the quality of the SRS IMR time series data and 
there is discrepancy between these data and other datasets such as the National Family Health Survey 
(NFHS). 
If validated in other studies, the implication of these results for health policy would be two-
fold: first, in order to maximize the effectiveness of health spending, it will be necessary to target 
additional public spending on health to the poor, high-mortality states of the country. Second, there is 
need for a state-stratified approach to health interventions. In states, such as Orissa, Bihar and Uttar 
Pradesh, additional spending needs to be directed toward basic child survival interventions, such as 
safe motherhood and child immunization. States such as Tamil Nadu and Kerala, which have already 
experienced significant reduction in infant mortality, will need to experiment with more creative 
policies that go beyond the basic child survival interventions. 
The importance of basic child survival interventions in the poor states can be highlighted by 
examining immunization coverage across states. Figure 25, which reports the measles vaccination rate 




Family Health Survey), indicates that in states, such as Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh and 
Rajasthan, fewer than a third of children aged 12-23 months were immunized against measles. Further, 
many of these states experienced a decline in measles immunization coverage between 1992-93 and 
1998-99. In Bihar, a mere 17 percent of children were immunized against measles in 1998-99. Thus, 
there is plenty of room for increasing immunization coverage in the poor states. On the other hand, in 
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Figure 2: Infant mortality rate by state, 1981 and 2004 
 
 





























Figure 3: Contribution of the 21 larger states to national infant deaths, 2000 
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Figure 4: Cumulative distribution of infant deaths in India across districts, 1994-98 
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 Figure 5: Public expenditure on health per capita in relation to per capita income, all low and 
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Figure 7: Percent public share in total health expenditure in relation to per capita income, all 












Figure 8: Percent private share in total health expenditure, all low and medium development 
countries, 2003 
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Figure 9: Infant mortality rate in relation to public expenditure on health per capita, all low and 
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Figure 10: Total (public plus private) expenditure on health per capita and private share (%) of 
health spending, by state, 2001-02 
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Figure 12: Relationship between public and private health expenditure per capita,  
across states, 2001-02 
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Panel B. Equity implications of universalizing immunization 
coverage




























































Figure 14.  Beneficiaries of immunization in India
Sources:   
Panel A:  International Institute for Population Sciences and ORC Macro.  2000.  National Family 
Health Survey (NFHS-2), 1998–99:  India. Mumbai: IIPS. 


































Panel B. Equity implications of universalizing births in health 
facilities



























































Figure 15.  Beneficiaries of births in health facilities 
Sources:   
Panel A:  International Institute for Population Sciences and ORC Macro.  2000.  National 
Family Health Survey (NFHS-2), 1998–99:  India. Mumbai: IIPS. 




Figure 16: Percent of outpatient treatments in past 15 days obtained from a public (as opposed 











Percent of outpatient treatments in past 15 days obtained from a public
(as opposed to private) provider, by state (rural only), 1995-96 and 2004






















Figure 17: Share of central grants in total government (revenue) expenditure on health, by 
function, selected states, 1991-92 and 1999-2000 
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Note: These data should be treated with care, as the ‘public health and family welfare’ category includes 
several expenditures (e.g., health education, drug control) that have little to do with public health, and 




Figure 18: Functional composition of state government health expenditures, 1999-2000 


































































Figure 19: Public expenditures as % of GDP for OECD 
 
















































Figure 20: Relationship between infant mortality and GDP per capita across Indian states, 
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Figure 21: Percent of households in selected Asian countries with health expenditures 


























































Figure 22: Increase in poverty head-count due to excluding out-of-pocket payments for health 
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Figure 23: Estimated effects of real public expenditure on health per capita on infant mortality 
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Figure 24: Measles vaccination rate (%) among 12-23 month olds, by state,  






















































Table 1. Deaths by causes in EAG states and Assam, 
2006 
Rank  Cause  Deaths      (% 
of total) 
1  Diarrhoeal diseases   11.20% 
2  Lower respiratory infections   8.69% 
3 Tuberculosis    7.55% 
4  Ischaemic heart disease   6.04% 
5 Asthma    5.94% 
6  Low birth weight   4.95% 
7 Malaria    4.83% 
8 Cerebrovascular  disease    4.07% 
9  Other perinatal conditions   3.93% 
10  Chronic obstructive pulmonary disease   3.56% 







Table 2. Cost, cost-effectiveness and avertable burden of a minimum Health Entitlement 
Program in the EAG states and Assam 
    
   Condition 
Total current burden of 









(DALYs or YLS) 
Cost per 
DALY or YLS 
averted (Rs.) 
Communicable Diseases, Reproductive Health, & 
Nutritional Deficiencies 
 
     




14 million births per year; 133 
thousand maternal deaths per 
year 
Expansion of institutionalized 
birth coverage to all mothers 
at the CHC level 
13 0.28  900,000  6,800 




0.6 million neonatal deaths 
per year 
Expansion of institutionalized 
birth coverage to all births 
(perinatal care incremental to 
maternal care) 
22 0.48  6,700,000  160 
           
 
    Expansion of coverage of 
postnatal care by health 
attendant to all births 
2 0.04  3,100,000 450 




0.1 million childhood and 
adolescent deaths per year 
attributable to TB meningitis, 
polio, diptheria, tetanus, and 
measles 
Expansion of Universal 
Immunization Program 
coverage to all children  4 0.08  11,200,000  160 





Measles  41 thousand measles deaths 
per year 
Addition of second measles 
dose in the UIP schedule at 
current coverage rates 
1 0.03  300,000  1,800 




10 thousand liver cancer 
deaths and 13 thousand liver 
cirrhosis deaths caused by 
HepB per year 
Inclusion of HepB vaccine in 
the UIP schedule at current 
coverage rates  2 0.04  400,000  2,200 





57 thousand deaths caused 
by Hib per year 
Inclusion of Hib vaccine in the 
UIP schedule at current 
coverage rates 
7 0.15  1,900,000 1,700 
           
 
Rotavirus  51 thousand childhood 
diarrhea deaths caused by 
rotavirus per year 
Inclusion of rotavirus vaccine 
in the UIP schedule at current 
coverage rates 
6 0.14  59,700,000  52 




179 thousand deaths caused 
by Streptococcus per year 
Inclusion of Streptococcus 
vaccine in the UIP schedule 
at current coverage rates 
3 0.07  12,500,000  170 
           
 
Malaria  1.1 million cases per year; 
193.3 thousand deaths per 
year 
Chloroquine for all Pv cases; 
artemisinin-based 
combination treatment for all 
Pf cases at 80% coverage 
0.46 0.01 6,100,000  36 
           
 
    Indoor residual spraying with 
deltamethrin at 80% coverage  40 0.89  2,000,000  10,000 
           
 
    Insecticide-treated bednets at 
80% coverage  44 0.97  3,800,000  6,000 
           
 
HIV/AIDS  0.7 million people currently 
infected; 5 thousand deaths 
per year 
Condom promotion targeted 
at 80% of sex workers from 
33% at baseline, over five 





           
 
    Voluntary counseling and 
testing delivered to a third of 
the sexually active population 
of India, resulting in a 50% 
reduction in risky behavior 
sustained over five years 
3 0.06  15,000,000  450 
           
 
    Mother to child transmission 
intervention via AZT, formula 
feeding, and no 
breastfeeding, over five years 
3 0.07  1,300,000 5,800 
           
 
    STI management, over five 
years  3 0.06  63,000,000  110 
           
 
   Structured  antiretroviral 
therapy for all symptomatic 
patients, over 35 years 
17 0.37  25,200,000 13,000 
           
 
Tuberculosis  0.6 million detected cases per 
year; 302 thousand deaths 
per year 
Directly observed short-
course chemotherapy for ss+ 
patients 
46 1.02  30,000,000 740 
           
 
    Directly observed short-
course chemotherapy for ss- 
patients 
29 0.64  5,000,000  2,900 
           
 
Diarrhea  202 thousand deaths per year 
among children under 5ya 
Oral rehydration therapy 
(facility or hospital based) for 
every diarrhea episode during 
the first five years of life 




           
 
   Maternity  services-based 
breastfeeding promotion  0.49 0.01 494,000  2,400 





290 thousand deaths per year 
among children under 5ya 
Case management of non-
severe cases at the 
community level over the first 
five years of life 
1 0.03  1,121,000 3,100 




1.3 million deaths per year  Vitamin A supplementation 
with syrup  0.23 0.01 2,900,000  180 




3.1 million with mild 
neurological disorders; 1 
million with cretinism 
Salt iodization for 10 years 
9 0.20  110,000,000  396 
           
Non-Communicable Diseases         




0.4 million deaths per year  Pharmaceutical management 
of acute myocardial infarction 
with aspirin and beta-blocker 
(annual) 
0.01 0.00 56,000  500 
           
 
    Legislation to limit trans fats 
in processed food (Assuming 
7% reduction in IHD from 
reducing 2% of energy from 
Trans fat over 10 years) 
1 0.02  6,800,000 1,700 
           
 
Cervical cancer  5.4 thousand deaths per year  Visual screening with ascetic 
acid, 1-visit, 1x per lifetime at 
age 35 
2 0.05  2000  (deaths)  150 
           
 
Epilepsy  26.7 thousand deaths per 
year 




           
 
Blindness  n.a. Extracapsular  cataract 
extraction with implantation of 
posterior chamber intraocular 
lens 
8 0.18  4,700,000 830 





340 thousand deaths 
attributable to tobacco per 
year 
10% price increase 
8 0.17  28,000,000  320 
           
 
    Nicotine replacement therapy 
at 5% effectiveness  130 2.80  9,200,000  6,700 
           






Table 3. Cost, cost-effectiveness and avertable burden of a minimum Health 
Entitlement Program in the non-EAGA states 
     
   Condition 
Total current burden of 









(DALYs or YLS) 
Cost per 
DALY or YLS 
averted (Rs.) 
Communicable Diseases, Reproductive Health, & 
Nutritional Deficiencies 
 
     




11 million births per year; 64 
thousand maternal deaths per 
year 
Expansion of institutionalized 
birth coverage to all mothers 
at the CHC level 
5 0.11  490,000  5,700 




0.3 million neonatal deaths 
per year 
Expansion of institutionalized 
birth coverage to all births 
(perinatal care incremental to 
maternal care) 
11 0.25  2,100,000  300 
           
 
    Expansion of coverage of 
postnatal care by health 
attendant to all births 
1 0.03  1,600,000 650 




0.1 million childhood and 
adolescent deaths per year 
attributable to TB meningitis, 
polio, diptheria, tetanus, and 
measles 
Expansion of Universal 
Immunization Program 
coverage to all children  1 0.02  4,700,000 100 





Measles  26 thousand measles deaths 
per year 
Addition of second measles 
dose in the UIP schedule at 
current coverage rates 
2 0.03  900,000  1,000 




15 thousand liver cancer 
deaths and 22 thousand liver 
cirrhosis deaths caused by 
hepatitis B per year 
Inclusion of hepatitus B 
vaccine in the UIP schedule 
at current coverage rates  2 0.05  1,200,000 900 





47 thousand deaths caused 
by Hib per year 
Inclusion of Hib vaccine in the 
UIP schedule at current 
coverage rates 
9 0.19  3,100,000 1,500 
           
 
Rotavirus  46 thousand childhood 
diarrhea deaths caused by 
rotavirus per year 
Inclusion of rotavirus vaccine 
in the UIP schedule at current 
coverage rates 
8 0.18  105,600,000  43 




141 thousand deaths caused 
by Streptococcus per year 
Inclusion of Streptococcus 
vaccine in the UIP schedule 
at current coverage rates 
4 0.09  10,100,000  310 
           
 
Malaria  0.7 million cases per year; 
59.8 thousand deaths per 
year 
Chloroquine for all Pv cases; 
artemisinin-based 
combination treatment for all 
Pf cases at 80% coverage 
0.20 0.00 2,200,000  51 
           
 
    Indoor residual spraying with 
deltamethrin at 80% coverage  40 0.89  700,000  31,000 
           
 
    Insecticide-treated bednets at 
80% coverage  44 0.97  1,300,000  18,000 
           
 
HIV/AIDS  3 million people currently 
infected; 18 thousand deaths 
per year 
Condom promotion targeted 
at 80% of sex workers from 
33% at baseline, over five 





           
 
    Voluntary counseling and 
testing delivered to a third of 
the sexually active population 
of India, resulting in a 50% 
reduction in risky behavior 
sustained over five years 
11 0.12  64,000,000 450 
           
 
    Mother to child transmission 
intervention via AZT, formula 
feeding, and no 
breastfeeding, over five years 
12 0.14  5,700,000  5,800 
           
 
    STI management, over five 
years  11 0.12  269,000,000  110 
           
 
   Structured  antiretroviral 
therapy for all symptomatic 
patients 
64 1.40  0  13,000 
           
 
Tuberculosis  0.8 million detected cases per 
year; 206 thousand deaths 
per year 
Directly observed short-
course chemotherapy for ss+ 
patients 
50 1.10  37,000,000 740 
           
 
    Directly observed short-
course chemotherapy for ss- 
patients 
34 0.74  6,400,000  2,900 
           
 
Diarrhea  180 thousand deaths per year 
among children under 5ya 
Oral rehydration therapy 
(facility or hospital based) for 
every diarrhea episode during 
the first five years of life 
18 0.41  3,618,000  14,000 





   Maternity  services-based 
breastfeeding promotion  0.33 0.01 456,000  2,000 





221 thousand deaths per year 
among children under 5ya 
Case management of non-
severe cases at the 
community level over the first 
five years of life 
1 0.02  714,000  3,300 




0.6 million deaths per year  Vitamin A supplementation 
with syrup  0.18 0.00 500,000  780 




3.5 million with mild 
neurological disorders; 1.2 
million with cretinism 
Salt iodization for 10 years 
9 0.20  120,000,000  396 
           
Non-Communicable Diseases         




0.6 million deaths per year  Pharmaceutical management 
of acute myocardial infarction 
with aspirin and beta-blocker 
(annual) 
0.02 0.00 87,000  500 
           
 
    Legislation to limit trans fats 
in processed food (Assuming 
7% reduction in IHD from 
reducing 2% of energy from 
Trans fat over 10 years) 
1 0.02  10,500,000  1,700 
           
 
Cervical cancer  5.5 thousand deaths per year  Visual screening with ascetic 
acid, 1-visit, 1x per lifetime at 
age 35 
3 0.06  1800  (deaths)  150 
           
 
Epilepsy  20.9 thousand deaths per 
year 
Treatment with phenobarbital  11 0.25  640,000  9,500 





Blindness  n.a. Extracapsular  cataract 
extraction with implantation of 
posterior chamber intraocular 
lens 
8 0.18  5,200,000 830 
           
 
Tobacco  360 thousand deaths 
attributable to tobacco per 
year 
10% price increase 
7 0.16  30,000,000  320 
           
 
    Nicotine replacement therapy 
at 5% effectiveness  120 2.67  9,800,000  6,700 
           
      Other non-price interventions  89 1.96  15,000,000 11,000 















Appendix Table 1: Fixed-effects, log-linear regression of infant mortality rate, pooled data for 1980-1999 across 
Indian states 
OLS Fixed  effects 



















Independent variable  (1) (2)  (3)  (4) (5)  (6)  (7) (8) 
Ln real gov’t health & family welfare expenditure. 


























































Ln F x Ln G           
-0.152 
(-0.40)   
Time trend (t)   
-0.013 


























Number of observations  278  278  278  278 
 
278 56  56  56 
F-test for model  68.31  44.41  249.32  173.98  194.00  29.05  19.76  23.58 
R-squared 0.33  0.35  0.94  0.94  0.95  0.94  0.96  0.96 
F-test for state effects     193.15  198.89 
 
261.63  15.19 13.89  18.61 
Notes: All regressions (with the exception of those marked *) use pooled data across 14 states and 20 years. Dependent variable is log of infant 
mortality rate. Data are obtained from various issues of the Sample Registration Surveys (SRS), state government budget demand documents, and 
CSO statistics on GSDP of states. All values are in constant 1993-94 Rupees (using state-specific GSDP deflators). Standard errors are corrected for 
heteroscedasticity using the Huber-white method. Figures in bold are statistically significant at the 10% or lower level. 
*Data on female literacy are available only for 1983-84, 1987-88, 1993-94 and 1999-2000, so these regressions are restricted to these four years. 